The use of telecommuting policies remains controversial for many employers because of the perceived opportunity for shirking outside of the traditional workplace; a problem that is potentially exacerbated if employees work in teams. Using a controlled experiment, where individuals work in teams with varying numbers of telecommuters, we test how telecommuting a¤ects the e¤ort choice of workers. We …nd that di¤erences in productivity within the team do not result from shirking by telecommuters; rather, changes in e¤ort result from an individual's belief about the productivity of their teammates. In line with stereotypes, a high proportion of both telecommuting and non-telecommuting participants believed their telecommuting partners were less productive. Consequently, lower expectations of partner productivity resulted in lower e¤ort when individuals were partnered with telecommuters. Our results suggest that managers should actively engage in disseminating productivity information to their telecommuting team in order to avoid negative e¤ects on productivity. JEL Classi…cation: M51 M54 J21 J24 J28 C90 Keywords: Telecommuting, Team Production, Productivity, Economic Experiments
Introduction
Many workers perform at least some work in a location other than the traditional o¢ ce. According to the 2010 American Time Use Survey, approximately 23% of the full-time employed performed some work at home on an average day. 1 Restricting the sample to wage and salary workers (excluding self-employed) only reduces this percentage to 19%.
Though the number of workers who perform at least some work at home is substantial, it is not necessarily the result of employers choosing to adopt telecommuting policies -the 2012 National Study of Employers found that only 6% of employers o¤ered paid work at home for the majority of employees. Moreover, existing telecommuting policies are being reversed and telecommuters are being recalled to the o¢ ce, suggesting a switch in the previous trend observed from the mid-1990's to the mid-2000's, where telecommuting rates almost doubled (Noonan and Glass, 2012). 2 At …rst glance, this trend is puzzling given the many known bene…ts which include decreased transportation costs, worker control over their work environments, and increased ‡ex-ibility (Nilles, 1975; Mokhtarian, 1991) . Accordingly, telecommuting policies have been shown to increase employee satisfaction, which attracts a higher quality, more diverse workforce, and reduces turnover (Baruch, 2000, Pinsonneault and Boisvert, 2001 ; Bailey and Kurland, 2002 ).
For employers, telecommuting policies indirectly lower costs through increased employee retention and directly lower costs through reduced overhead expenditures associated with housing employees in a traditional o¢ ce (Piskurich, 1996) . 3 Even though the adoption rate has been relatively high, Matthews and Williams (2005) estimated that approximately 40% of the work force in the United States could still potentially telecommute; yet, taking into account the known bene…ts, why so few managers have chosen to implement regular telecommuting policies remains unclear. One obvious conjecture for the lack of adoption is that managers hold strong beliefs that telecommuting will lead to shirking outside of the o¢ ce -a problem that is potentially exacerbated by the widespread use of teams in the workplace. The goal of the research reported in this paper is to provide direct evidence of the consequences of telecommuting on work performed in teams.
Our current understanding of how the telecommuting environment a¤ects worker productivity is not well understood (Bailey and Kurland, 2002; Menezes and Kelliher, 2011) . A number of survey studies, which ask telecommuters directly if they are more productive in their telecom- 1 The average day is a measure de…ned by the American Time Use Survey (ATUS) that is the average distribution of hours measured across all persons in the reference population for all days of the week. 2 Yahoo CEO Marissa Mayer's decision to recall telecommuters in 2013 was a prominent example of a recent reversal (Tkaczyk, 2013) . The large electronics retailer, Best Buy, followed suit a week after Yahoo's decision was publicized (Pepitone, 2013) . In 2012, Bank of America implemented more restrictions into its ‡exible time work program, "My Work" (O'Daniel, 2012). 3 Piskurich (1996) estimated that telecommuting may save as much as $8,000 per worker annually.
muting environment or in the o¢ ce environment, have found that employees who telecommute self-report that they are more productive (see for example Bailyn, 1988; Belanger, 1999; Hill et al., 1998) . The self-reported surveys are extremely useful as a …rst approximation, but the potential for misreporting cannot be ruled out. An earlier example of a non-survey study is DuBrin (1991) , which compares the productivity of workers a manager allowed to telecommute with those the manager did not allow to telecommute. DuBrin found that telecommuters were more productive, but this study is not able to isolate the e¤ect of work environment because of potential selection e¤ects -the workers who are allowed to telecommute may have built up the trust of the manager through their work ethic. The above di¢ culties in gathering productivity measures are exaggerated when considering work performed in teams.
To overcome the di¢ culties involved in isolating the response to the work environment, we utilize an incentivized real-e¤ort experiment which randomly assigned the participants (workers) to either telecommute or work in an o¢ ce-like environment. Random assignment to work location was also used in two recent studies, Dutcher (2012) and Bloom et al. (2012) , to examine individual productivity di¤erences across work environments. Dutcher designed an experiment around creative and dull tasks which randomly assigned individuals to an o¢ ce-like environment or a location of their choice and found that the productivity of the telecommuters decreased for the dull task, but increased for the creative task. While these studies contribute to an understanding of individual productivity when workers telecommute, to our knowledge, no empirical evidence exists for the impact of telecommuting policies on individual productivity within a team. Arguably, the examination of telecommuting policies on work performed in teams should be of utmost importance given the prevalence of team usage in the workplace (Milliken and Martins, 1996) and the well-known incentives for shirking under team production (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982; Jones, 1984; Albanese and van Fleet, 1985) .
Work performed in teams is more likely to lead to individual shirking behavior when an individual's e¤ort is masked in the team output (Jones, 1984) . A common managerial solution to this free-rider problem involves either direct monitoring by managers or member monitoring in the case of self-managed teams (Albanese and van Fleet, 1985; Erez et al., 2002) . However, monitoring is substantially more di¢ cult (if not impossible) in the telecommuting environment, and so telecommuting teams may result in lower productivity than their traditional o¢ ce counterparts if individuals choose to free-ride.
In this research, we examine the behavior of both telecommuting and non-telecommuting individuals working in teams. To accomplish this, we designed a novel experiment where the experiment participants were randomly assigned to work on team production tasks based in either a traditional structured o¢ ce-type location or an unstructured location of their choice.
3
Our participants were drawn from a subject pool of undergraduate and graduate students and the work involved a paid typing task which asked the subjects to correctly decode a string of 6 letters into a set of 6 numbers. With the simplicity of our design and choice of task, we are able to identify the basic behavioral reasons driving e¤ort choices in this environment.
Regardless of their location, all subjects participated initially on their own where they were paid a piece-rate wage based on how many typing tasks were correctly completed in a set period of time. This individual stage familiarized the participants with the exact task to be performed in a team. Following the individual stage, the subjects were matched with two teammates to participate in a team stage that mimicked the individual stage in all aspects except that payment was now based on average team output. After the initial team stage, the participants were twice rematched with new teammates for two additional team rounds. Each team round varied the locational composition of the members in the team where every subject was teamed with 0 (2), 1 (1), and 2 (0) teammates who were telecommuters (non-telecommuters).
A priori we hypothesized that observed di¤erences in a worker's productivity when moving from a group with more telecommuters to a group with fewer telecommuters would result from a worker's beliefs over other team members'productivity. Speci…cally, if an individual's productivity within a group is conditioned on their beliefs, then beliefs that other members are free-riding (even if it is false) may adversely impact team productivity in a way that would not otherwise occur in a traditional o¢ ce where it is easier to observe how much e¤ort is being exerted by other team members. For example, if traditional o¢ ce workers are conditional cooperators, and if they believe their telecommuting teammates are choosing to shirk, they will reciprocate by exerting less e¤ort. 4 Similarly, when placed in a group with no telecommuters, traditional o¢ ce workers may have more optimistic beliefs of high teammate productivity and will respond by increasing e¤ort levels. To examine how an individual's productivity within a team is in ‡uenced by beliefs over the productivity of other team members, we adopted an incentivized beliefs measurement technique, which asked the individual to estimate the output of their partner(s).
Accuracy of the estimate was rewarded by monetary payment, which incentivized participants to truthfully report their beliefs of partner productivity (Palfrey and Wang, 2009 ). We elicited these beliefs for both telecommuters and non-telecommuters, which provides an overall picture of worker beliefs and allows us to control for di¤erences in team production arising not because of location, but because of beliefs over the relative productivity of partners.
We …nd that the majority of individuals believed that telecommuters were less productive than their non-telecommuting counterparts, but we do not …nd evidence of shirking by telecommuters to support this belief. Rather, we …nd that output di¤erences in teams with telecommuters result from an individual's beliefs about the output of their teammates. Speci…cally, when individuals believed that their telecommuting partners were less productive than their 4 A conditional cooperator is one who is willing to contribute more e¤ort to the team as long as others in team are also contributing more e¤ort, and will reduce e¤ort if others in the team are reducing e¤ort. The terminology comes from public goods theory where work teams have been modeled as a public goods game (Dickinson, and Isaac, 1998; Keser and Van Winden, 2000; Fischbacher et al. 2001) non-telecommuting partners, they worked less in the group with telecommuters. Interestingly, both telecommuters and non-telecommuters held the belief that telecommuting partners were productively inferior to non-telecommuting partners, and both responded reciprocally to these beliefs, but the e¤ect of the telecommuter partner beliefs was stronger.
These …ndings have direct consequences for managers who currently manage or plan to implement telecommuting teams. Our results indicate that if workers are allowed to telecommute, partnering the telecommuters in teams with non-telecommuters could result in lower e¤ort by both o¢ ce-based and telecommuting workers due to beliefs that telecommuting partners will shirk. To o¤set the productivity declines in the team environment, managers should engage in activities that update and maintain the workers'perceptions (beliefs) that all members of the team are contributing high e¤ort.
Experimental Design
The experiment was designed around two types of subjects: non-telecommuters and telecommuters. Non-telecommuters were individuals recruited to participate in the laboratory at a pre-speci…ed time. Telecommuters were individuals recruited to participate online at a place of their choosing anytime within a 24 hour block of time. 5 To avoid self-selection issues, the assignment of location was random and subjects in both locations wcere recruited in exactly the same manner. 6 Each subject, regardless of type, participated in a series of four 8-minute rounds that gave them the option to spend their time on a paid typing task, unpaid games of tic-tac-toe, or some combination of both tasks. The paid typing task required subjects to decode a series of 6 random letters into a series of 6 numbers using a code that changed with each combination of letters. 7 All subjects received the same random sequence of letters and code in each round and across all four rounds the typing task was always paid while tic-tac-toe was never paid. 8 Tic-tac-toe was included as an unpaid outside option so that productivity results for the paid task are not biased towards higher levels exclusively via boredom in the laboratory. To maintain parallelism in the experimental design, the unpaid option was given to all participants regardless of location. Prior to the set of paid rounds, all subjects participated in an unpaid and virtually unlimited practice period of the typing task and tic-tac-toe. Neither of the tasks required practice for mastery, but including this round familiarized subjects with the interface used during the paid rounds. 9 5 We did place one restriction on the location choice of telecommuting subjects. We asked that they participate in any location except the computer laboratory where the laboratory experiment was taking place to ensure true location di¤erences. 6 The participation (show-up) rate was similar for subjects recruited to both locations thus ensuring that the assignment to location was truly random. 7 We used a revolving code to minimize learning e¤ects. 8 Experimental instructions and screenshots from the experiment are given in the Appendix. 9 The program had 100 random codes for the subject to practice with before the codes would repeat and unlimited games of tic-tac-toe. On average, subjects correctly coded 14 words in the coding task and played 5 games of tic-tac-toe in the practice round.
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The …rst paid 8-minute round was always played as an individual, regardless of location.
The individual round gave subjects experience in the mechanism before they went on to the team round. The individual round paid 8 e-cents for each correctly coded set of 6 letters.
Following the individual stage, all subjects then entered into a series of three team rounds that varied the locational composition of partners. In order to isolate the environmental e¤ects, our teams were purposefully minimalistic with no interaction, feedback of partner performance, and were teams primarily in the sense that team output was the determinant of pay rather than individual output. 10 Subjects'anonymity was preserved through the use of a random number for identi…cation and payment.
The team stage itself was identical to the individual stage in that each subject had the option of using the entire 8 minutes on the paid typing task or unpaid tic-tac-toe, or some combination of both. However, in the team rounds the payment for the typing task was now equal to 8 e-cents multiplied by the average correct output of the team so that e¤ort exerted in the paid task was exerted for the team. In other words, we implemented a team pay scheme that involved equal revenue sharing between the partners. Note that this reduced the marginal payment for each correctly coded word by 2/3.
Prior to each team round, we primed the subjects with their location and their partners' locations, which changed in each round. To guarantee that subjects were fully aware of the location of their teammates, we also included prominent location information at the top of the screen where the subjects performed the tasks. Partner types de…ne our experimental treatments:
1. Mixed Partners (LT) -each subject was matched with one telecommuter and one non-telecommuter.
2.
Telecommuting Partners (TT) -each subject was matched with two telecommuting partners.
3. Non-telecommuting Partners (LL) -each subject was matched with two non-telecommuting partners.
Recognizing that this type of task may result in fatigue or learning over subsequent rounds, leading to the possibility of order e¤ects, we ran four orders of the above treatments for each location type of subject. This resulted in 8 total sessions summarized in Table 2 .1. 11 We use Lab (L) to denote non-telecommuters who participated in the laboratory and T elecommuter (T) to denote subjects participating in a location of their choice. We ensured that subjects were matched in a round with others primed with the same group composition. 12 Order Lab (# of Subjects) Telecommuter (# of Subjects)
1
LL, TT, LT (17) TT, LL, LT (18) 2 LL, LT, TT (19) TT, LT, LL (16) 3 TT, LT, LL (18) LL, LT, TT (17) 4 LT, TT, LL (16) LT, LL, TT All answers were paid in e-cents with a correct answer yielding payment of e 1. The use of the quadratic rule implied that incorrect answers were also paid, but as the distance between the respondent's answer and the correct answer increased, earnings decreased rapidly, providing strong incentives to answer with accurate beliefs. Incorrect answers that would lead to negative earnings were capped at zero.
For individual round beliefs, subjects were asked to guess the average performance of those who participated in the lab and the average performance of telecommuters. In teams, subjects were asked to guess the performance of their teammates. When their teammates were both from the same location, the subjects were asked to guess the average of both teammates, while in the mixed partner treatment, subjects were asked to guess the absolute performance of each teammate.
After beliefs, we also elicited risk preferences using a mechanism adapted from Eckel and Grossman (2008) . Subjects were o¤ered a choice between …ve binary 50/50 gambles where both expected value and risk are increasing in the order of gambles. Choosing a lower gamble corresponds to higher risk aversion. The experiment ended with subjects …lling out a nonincentivized survey to gather basic data, such as demographic information.
The experimental design was programmed using Z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) , and subjects were recruited through ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . We ensured that the recruitment procedure did not reveal that some of the subjects would be asked to participate online or the nature of the experiment. After the initial recruitment, subjects that would participate in instructions for the telecommuting subjects stated that they would be paired with one partner in the laboratory and one partner also participating in a location of their choice. Priming for the other treatments was conducted in a similar fashion, taking into account di¤erences in a subject's perception of the location of partners based on their own location.
7 the laboratory were instructed of the time and place to participate via e-mail. Telecommuting subjects were sent an e-mail that directed them to a website with a link that contained an installer for the client-side of Z-tree (zleaf) which would connect to the university server for these subjects to participate online. The telecommuting subjects were instructed to participate in a location of their choice and informed that they had 24 hours to complete the experiment.
The nature of the experiment required that payment was delayed for all subjects, which has the added bene…t that the payment delay was identical for both telecommuters and nontelecommuters. Each subject received an e-mail within 3 days of their participation that their payment was ready and that they should bring their unique subject ID with them to collect payment. The average subject payment was e 13.87 -all of which was from incentivized tasks.
Hypotheses
Our …rst hypothesis is derived from the commonly held (mis)perception that telecommuters are less productive than their o¢ ce-based counterparts. beliefs are about their teammates, which were gathered via an incentivized mechanism. Second, it requires us to determine if these beliefs in ‡uence behavior. Speci…cally, we will examine how subjects' beliefs vary with the location of their teammates and how this in ‡uences their own behavior. In our setting, this hypothesis predicts that if subjects have varying beliefs on the productivity of their team members, based on location, their e¤ort in the team will re ‡ect these beliefs. The most obvious implication of this hypothesis is if subjects believe that telecommuters are less productive, regardless of location, then Hypothesis 2 predicts lower resulting e¤ort when the individual is partnered with a telecommuter. 
Results
To test Hypothesis 1, we will begin our analysis with an overview of the beliefs data. We …rst examine the di¤erences in beliefs when subjects were asked to predict the output of telecommuters and non-telecommuters within the same treatment (mixed partner treatment). This is a clean starting point to examine di¤erences in beliefs since this treatment provides us with the subject's true beliefs about the productivity of telecommuters and non-telecommuters in the same team setting. Recall, the beliefs were incentivized so the closer subjects were to correctly predicting the outcomes, the more money they received. thought those based in the lab were more productive than, as productive as, or less productive than telecommuters. It is evident that many more subjects believed that lab subjects (non-telecommuters) were more productive than telecommuters than believed they were less productive or equally productive.
A McNemar's test con…rms that the number of subjects who thought those in the lab were more productive is greater than those who thought there was no di¤erence (p<0.01) or who thought telecommuters were more productive (p<0.01). The same result can also be found when looking at beliefs over productivity in the individual treatment where subjects were also 9 asked to compare the productivity of subjects in each location. In the individual treatment, 47%
believed those in the lab were more productive, while 26% thought there was no di¤erence, and 27% believed telecommuters were more productive. We also …nd that subjects'perceptions about the relative productivity of non-telecommuter vs. telecommuter are fairly consistent across all treatments. Using a pair-wise correlation, we …nd that the di¤erences in beliefs between the LL and TT treatments are strongly correlated with di¤erences in beliefs in the LT treatment (p= 0.001) and with di¤erences in beliefs in the individual treatment (p=0.006). A ttest also con…rms that there is no statistical di¤erence between these three measures (p 0.142).
In contrast to the modal belief held by both telecommuters and non-telecommuters that telecommuters are less productive than non-telecommuters, we …nd no signi…cant evidence that telecommuters were actually less productive than non-telecommuters. In the individual stage, which is the most appropriate treatment to determine di¤erences in productivity arising solely from location, the average non-telecommuter output was 22.36 correctly coded strings of letters while telecommuters averaged 23.74 (t-test for di¤erences; p = 0.211). 13 Result 1: Both telecommuters and non-telecommuters believed that telecommuting would have a detrimental e¤ ect on productivity.
Having established Hypothesis 1, we now turn to Hypothesis 2, which predicts beliefs will in ‡uence e¤ort choices.
To begin the examination of how beliefs correlate with e¤ort decisions, To go beyond simple correlations, we take advantage of the fact that our experimental design employed two extreme treatments where …rst, an individual was paired with two telecommuters (TT) and second, the same individual was paired with two lab-based, non-telecommuting subjects (LL). Contrasting the beliefs and e¤ort decisions of both telecommuters and nontelecommuters between these treatments provides straightforward evidence for how subjects reacted to the locational composition of the team. Figure 4 .3 charts the di¤erence in output between the two treatments when subjects believed 1 3 Similar to the individual stage, the team treatments also do not result in signi…cant di¤erences in average output between telecommuters and non-telecommuters (t-tests): LL (p=0.677), TT (p=0.236), and LT (p=0.137). However, we do …nd a great deal of heterogeneity present in the team environment. As such, this simple analysis of averages fails to address features of teamwork that may change e¤ort (i.e. beliefs of partner productivity), and more generally, subject heterogeneity. We account for these issues more formally in the next section through regression analysis. the telecommuter was less productive (NOT better) and when subjects believed the telecommuter was more productive (better). The vertical axis represents the di¤erence in a subject's output when paired with two telecommuting subjects versus when they were paired with two non-telecommuting subjects. Values above zero indicate that the subject produced more when paired with two telecommuters than when paired with two non-telecommuters while values below zero imply the opposite.
The graph shows that subjects who believed that telecommuters are better than their lab counterparts increased their output when paired with two telecommuters over what they produced when they were paired with two non-telecommuters. The reverse is true when subjects believed that telecommuters were not better. If a subject held beliefs that telecommuters were less productive than those in the lab, output in TT was below their productivity when they were paired with non-telecommuting teammates (LL). Notice that these results hold regardless of whether or not the subject was lab-based or a telecommuter.
For a more formal understanding of output decisions and how they relate to beliefs, we turn to regression analysis seen in Table 4 In Model 1, we use the di¤erences in beliefs when a subject was paired with two telecommuters versus when they were paired with two non-telecommuting teammates (Di¤erence in Beliefs). 14 In Model 2, we replace the beliefs di¤erence with the separate beliefs a subject held about the productivity of their non-telecommuting teammates (Beliefs of Lab Teammates) and the beliefs of their telecommuting teammates (Beliefs of Telecommuting Teammates). The purpose of this speci…cation is to determine which of the two sets of beliefs, the beliefs a subject held about their telecommuting teammates or the beliefs they held about their non-telecommuting teammates, were more important in explaining the variance in output. Model 3 adds an interaction of these two beliefs with location to explore if telecommuter or lab-based subjects di¤ered in their behavior. In addition to these primary variables, we also include control variables for Table 4 .1: Regressions on the di¤erence in correctly coded output when a subject was paired with two other subjects who were at home (TT) versus when they were paired with two other subjects who were in the lab (LL). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 numbers correspond to higher risk aversion.
Notice that because the dependent variable is the output of a subject when paired with two telecommuters minus output when paired with two non-telecommuters, Figure 4 .3 implies that there exists a negative correlation between the beliefs about lab subjects and this di¤erence in output, and a positive correlation on the beliefs of telecommuters. In other words, the di¤erence in output should become more negative as beliefs regarding the productivity of nontelecommuters become more positive since there is a positive relationship between beliefs and e¤ort. Similar logic applies for the beliefs of telecommuter productivity.
From all models, it is evident that beliefs are highly correlated with output di¤erences. In Table 4 .2: In the OLS model, the dependent variable is again the di¤erence in correctly coded output when a subject was paired with two other subjects who were at home (TT) versus when they were paired with two other subjects who were in the lab (LL). In the Probit model, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the subject's output was higher when paired with two other subjects who were at home (TT) than when they were paired with two other subjects who were in the lab (LL). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
For robustness, we re-ran Model 2 on various sub-samples and using di¤erent speci…cations.
Speci…cally, we re-ran Model 2 for males, females, high productivity subjects, and low productivity subjects. We also used a probit regression in our robustness checks where the dependent variable is a binary indicator equal to 1 if the di¤erence in output is negative. Though the measures di¤er some, the basic e¤ect of a positive relationship between e¤ort and beliefs still holds. For succinctness, we relegate this analysis to the Appendix.
We now turn our attention to which set of beliefs, telecommuter or non-telecommuter partner productivity, has a larger impact on an individual's e¤ort. From Model 2 in Table 4 .1, we can see that the size of the e¤ect on beliefs about telecommuting teammates is larger than for lab teammates and a Wald test con…rms that the di¤erence is signi…cant (p = 0.019). So, even though beliefs of both types of partners are important, we …nd that the beliefs of telecommuting partners impact output choices more than beliefs of lab partners.
Result 3: Beliefs of telecommuting partners are more in ‡uential in determining own output choices than beliefs of non-telecommuting partners.
From Result 2, we have established that the average subject in our setting is a conditional cooperator. Table 4 .2 provides additional regressions to examine the conditional cooperation behavior in more depth. Conditional cooperation in our framework relies not only on the expected output of a teammate, but also on how that output was achieved; i.e., was the output when paired with telecommuters di¤erent due to the perceived di¤erence in the amount of e¤ort telecommuters were exerting (perceptions of shirking), or some other outcome measure such as ability or di¤erences in access to better technologies? 15 We examine this question by including a new explanatory binary variable, Believed Telecommuter Shirked More, which is equal to 1 if a subject believed telecommuters would be more likely to shirk than non-telecommuters in the team treatments compared to the individual treatments. 16 This contrasts with the Di¤erence in Beliefs variable used in the previous regressions provided in Table 4 .1 in all ways except that our new beliefs variable replaces the previous beliefs measures. The second model uses a probit regression where the dependent variable is binary indicator equal to 1 if the di¤erence in output between the team treatments is negative (a subject contributed more in LL than in TT).
From both regressions, we can see that having beliefs that telecommuters shirked more from the individual to the team phase signi…cantly a¤ected the di¤erences in output. The marginal e¤ect from the probit model (not reported here) indicates that if a subject believed a telecommuter shirked more, they were 20% less likely to contribute more in TT than in LL.
Conclusion
In this research, we address a fundamental question for managers: How does telecommuting in ‡uence the individual e¤ort exerted in teams? Answering this question is vital since managers still have reservations about allowing their employees to work outside the o¢ ce. We focus on teams because the additional free-riding incentives present in work performed in a group compounds fear that the telecommuting environment fosters shirking behavior.
In order to provide more relevant policy recommendations, we also set out to answer, not just if, but why productivity may vary when someone moves from working in a traditional o¢ ce-based team to a telecommuting team. To answer this, we designed an experiment which randomly assigned subjects to participate in either the laboratory at a speci…ed time, or online in a location and time of their choice. They were asked to perform a paid real-e¤ort task in teams of three where treatments varied the number of telecommuters. The participants were also asked to estimate the output of their non-telecommuting and telecommuting partners of the previous rounds as a measurement of beliefs. We incentivized this portion of the experiment so that correct and near-correct answers received a relatively high payo¤, ensuring the accuracy of these beliefs.
The central result of our study is that we observe signi…cant variation in the e¤ort of individuals when they are partnered with telecommuters versus when they are partnered with non-telecommuters, and this is driven primarily by an individual's beliefs over their partners'
productivity. The majority of participants -telecommuters and non-telecommuters alike -believed that telecommuters were less productive. The e¤ort observed across treatments was found to be positively related to these beliefs, which provides an explanation for why individuals may be less productive when they are in a telecommuting team.
This paper has two main implications for managers currently managing telecommuters or considering implementation of a telecommuting policy. First, we do not …nd evidence of exaggerated shirking by telecommuters in teams. Second, we do …nd that the majority of individuals (including telecommuters) believe telecommuters are more likely to shirk and many reduce their relative work e¤ort in response. Consequently, teams that include at least one telecommuter would bene…t from manager reinforcement that all team members are contributing high e¤ort to maintain high e¤ort levels across all workers.
In addition to the telecommuting environment, these results tie into the literature on team production modeled in a public goods framework ( Our study is an initial investigation into how individuals respond to the presence of telecommuters when working in teams. By design, the work environment we examine is stark with limited feedback and interaction between partners. This deliberate choice was made to avoid confounding factors in our results, but at a cost of realism. We also purposefully chose a mundane task, instead of a task where more creativity would be involved, to increase the attractiveness of shirking so that this study would be able to serve as a baseline for behavior in telecommuting teams. Future research should extend the environment with (possibly repeated) interaction between partners, feedback to teammates about performance, and task variety.
Experimental Instructions

Introduction:
Thank you for participating in today's experiment. These instructions explain the nature of today's experiment as well as how to work the computer interface you will be using.
These instructions are complex, please make sure you read through them carefully. The instructions and stages of the experiment are self-paced, so when you have …nished and a "Continue" button is available, please press it.
General Description: This is an experiment on the economics of decision making where you will have the chance to earn money based on the decisions made by you and others. You should be able to complete the entire experiment on your own without any external assistance of any kind.
You will have the opportunity to make money during today's experiment, which consists of four, 8-minute rounds. Because of the nature of the experiment, your payment cannot be immediately calculated. More detailed instructions for how you can pick up your cash payment for participation today will be given at the end of the experiment.
All payments are con…dential; no other participant will be told the amount you make.
Tasks:
In each round, you will be able to choose between two tasks. You can split your time among the tasks however you choose. Meaning you can spend all of your time on task I and none on 23 task II, all of your time on task II and none on task I, or some combination of task I and task II, or neither.
Please press "Continue" to see an example of the tasks you will be presented with in each round.
Task 1:
For task I, a string of 6 random letters is displayed below a code bar. The code bar will link a series of letters with a corresponding number. Your task is to …nd the corresponding number associated with the letters and type it in the space provided. Once you are satis…ed with your answer, you will hit the "check answer" button to submit your answer. For each correctly coded string, you will receive e0.08.
The example below shows you the layout of the game. After you submit a code correctly, the code bar will change and a new set of random letters will appear
In this example, the correct code would be 10 17 12 11 22 17. You would get credit for this answer by typing each number in the box below each letter which corresponds to this number in the code bar. However, because this is an example, the "Check Answer" button is nonfunctioning. During the actual experiment, you would submit your answer with the "Check Answer" button.
Please press Continue to see an example of the second task you will be presented with in each round.
Task 2:
In task II, you will be playing a game against the computer. The game is commonly known as tic-tac-toe. There are nine spaces in which to either put an X or an O. The X represents your choice, while the O represents the computer's choice. You will win the game when you have three X's in a row.
You will be able to track your wins and losses against the computer. You will not be paid for playing tic-tac-toe.
Practice:
To familiarize yourself with the tasks and computer interface, you will be taken to a practice round. You will not be paid for this round, it is only for practice purposes. Please press continue to enter into the practice round.
When you have …nished practicing the two tasks, you may continue whenever you are ready by clicking Continue.
Below, you will see an example screen of the screen you would see during a round. You will always have the ability to play both tasks in a round.
In the actual experiment, the left box will contain detailed information about how you will be paid while the right box will contain the summary instructions for both tasks.
Payo¤s:
As explained previously, you will be presented with two tasks: the coding task and tic-tactoe. For each correctly coded string in the coding task, you will receive e0.08. Incorrectly coded strings carry no penalty of payment. Tic-tac-toe is unpaid. Let's go through an example of how payo¤s work.
Payment Example:
Assume in this round you correctly coded 35 strings of random characters in the allotted time. Since you will get e0.08 for each correctly typed entry, you would receive e2.80 for this round.
If on the other hand you correctly coded 30 strings of random characters in the allotted time, you would receive e2.40 for this round.
Timing:
The time remaining in each round will be displayed in the upper right corner of your screen.
When the time limit of 8 minutes has expired, you will automatically be taken to a new screen with instructions on how to proceed. When you are ready, please click continue to enter into round 1.
New Instructions:
The tasks and time limit (8 minutes) in this round are the same as the previous round.
However, there is an important change. The di¤erence between this round and the previous round you played is that instead of playing as an individual, you will now be playing in a group of two others and your pay will now depend on your choices and the choices of two others. The others in your group will either perform the task in the SOWI Computer lab or in a location of their choice. More on the locations in a moment.
You will be randomly and anonymously matched with the others in your group. The other members of the group will be given the same two tasks that you are, and as before, the coding task is the only task paid, however, the way that the coding task is paid has changed.
New Payo¤s:
In this round, you and the other 2 members of your group will accumulate group earnings equal to e0.08 for each correctly coded string your group solves, together. These group earnings will then be equally divided between you and the other two members of your group. In equation form, your payo¤ = [e0.08 * (your output + member 1's output +member 2's output)]/3
To understand how the team payment scheme di¤ers from the individual payment scheme, 
Group Member Information:
All choices are anonymous. The other members in your group will never be told your speci…c output, nor will they be told the amount that you played tic-tac-toe. Likewise, you will never be told the speci…c output of your group members or how much they played tic-tac-toe.
The only information you will be given about the other members of your group is where they will be participating. Similarly, the other members of your group will only know that you are participating in "the SOWI computer lab ("a location of your choice"). The members of your group are not necessarily participating today.
You are about to begin the next round, but before you begin, we will give you information about the location of the members of your group.
Location of the members of your Group: You are currently participating in "the SOWI computer lab" ("a location of your choice").
The other members of your group are also participating in "the SOWI computer lab." ("a location of their choice, which is not the SOWI computer lab (for example, they may be participating from home on their personal computer).
When you are ready, please click continue to enter into the next round.
